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This research examined how group processes alter the impact of alcohol on a judgment task requiring 
vigilance. The authors compared two competing explanations, deindividuation and group monitoring, 
for the possible effects of alcohol. Two hundred and eighty-six undergraduates with normal drinking 
habits undertook a vigilance task alone or in four-person groups having consumed either alcohol 
(calculated to achieve up to .08 blood alcohol content) or a placebo. The vigilance task required them 
to count occurrences of the word “the” in a spoken passage. Alcohol significantly impaired the 
performance of individuals but not groups. Group members performed at a similar level in both 
conditions, making fewer errors than individuals in the alcohol condition. The fit of different 
decision-making models were tested. In both the alcohol and placebo conditions, group consensus 
was predicted by processes consistent with the group monitoring hypothesis. The evidence highlights 
that under certain conditions, group process can compensate for the cognitively impairing effects of 
alcohol on individuals. 
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It is widely assumed that the consumption of alcohol 
inevitably causes serious social problems. In the United 
Kingdom, 48% of violent crimes (Home Office, 2006) and 
21,000 accident and emergency admissions (Department of 
Health, 2004) are associated with alcohol. Employers are 
becoming increasingly concerned about alcohol in the work 
place. Many are introducing stringent alcohol controls 
including the introduction of random testing for public 
servants and employees of many private companies 
(Independent Inquiry into Drug Test at Work, 2004). 
However, social drinking (i.e., consuming alcohol in small 
groups) remains ubiquitous in many societies. Despite this 
and a large body of evidence that examines problem drinking, 
it is perhaps surprising that there is little systematic evidence 
on how or whether being in a group alters the consequences of 
alcohol consumption. 
Alcohol can also facilitate social interactions by 
reducing social anxiety and easing communication (Hull, 
1981) and increasing social bonding when groups are forming 
(Kirchner, Sayette, Cohn, Moreland, & Levine, 2006). 
However, the research literature tends to focus more on the 
negative impacts of alcohol. Alcohol can foster violence 
(Pernanen, 1991), sexual impulsivity (Stall, McKusick, Wiley, 
Coates, &Ostrow, 1986), and certain forms of risk 
taking (Sayette, Kirchner, Moreland, Levine, & Travis, 2004). 
Alcohol levels as low as 0.02% blood alcohol concentration 
(BAC), only one-quarter the British drink and drive limit in 
the U.K., can be detrimental for tasks that require sustained 
attention (Koelega, 1995). Moderate and high levels of 
alcohol have been shown to reduce performance on both 
divided attention tasks and vigilance attention tasks (Koelega, 
1998; Mongrain& Standing, 1989; Moskowitz &Depry, 
1968; Schulte, Muller Oehring, Strasburger, Warzel, &Sabel, 
2001). 
Whereas it is known that alcohol impairs individuals' 
ability to sustain vigilance, it is not known whether 
comparable effects will be found in groups. Abrams and 
colleagues (Abrams, Hopthrow, Hulbert, & Frings, 2006) 
proposed various processes that could mean groups might 
attenuate or exacerbate such effects. In the present study, we 
test how group processes influence performance on a 
vigilance task following alcohol consumption by individuals 
and group members. 
Continuous attention to incoming information is a 
common task facing groups or teams as well as individuals. 
Examples of this include groups of watch-keepers on board 
ships or individuals taking notice during workshops, seminars, 
or committees. Alcohol is often used in contexts where group 
vigilance is required, and impaired vigilance could have 
severe consequences. Alcohol is often quoted as being the 
cause of (occasionally fatal) accidents in maritime and 
aeronautical contexts. For instance, of 23 maritime accident 
fatalities in U.K. waters in 2005, alcohol played a major part 
in four (Maritime Accident Investigation Branch, 2006). The 
National Aeronautical Space Agency (NASA; 2007) also 
reveals moderate alcohol use is an accepted feature of some 
astronauts' personal preflight routines. Although this has not 
been linked to a specific accident, it has sparked a debate as 
the level to which the astronauts' behavior would affect their 
performance in a high-risk environment, 
One form of vigilance task that may be affected by alcohol 
is cumulative quantity estimation (attending to stimuli and 
attempting to identify the number of times a target appears). 
In cumulative quantity estimation, a recurring target must be 
identified and added to a running total. Several cognitive 
activities are needed for accurate cumulative quantity 
estimations. Attention must be sustained for the duration of 
the task to detect targets. Short-term memory is needed to 
update the total and a priori estimates and information need to 
be appropriately generated and integrated into the final 
judgment. These activities are also needed in situations that 
could be encountered while mildly intoxicated in the company 
of others. For instance, drivers need to sustain attention upon 
the road, continually monitor for road signs, and maintain 
numbers (such as the speed limit) in short-term memory. Such 
activities may also be group based, for example, ship crews 
may need collectively to monitor for safety information such 
as the visual/auditory presence of other shipping. These 
examples raise the question of how alcohol and group 
processes combine to affect judgments in cumulative quantity 
estimation tasks requiring vigilance. 
In the present study, we ask individuals or four-person 
groups to complete a vigilance task while either sober or 
intoxicated. In the groups, members first make private 
judgments and then have to arrive at a group consensus. We 
consider that groups could potentially enhance or undermine 
performance for various reasons including social 
facilitation and social loafing. Thus one question is the 
empirical issue of changes in mean level performance under 
alcohol and comparing individuals and groups. The second 
aim of this research was to understand more clearly the 
processes involved in group judgments. Specifically, we 
compare different statistical models of how groups arrive at 
their judgments that test the relative fit of two competing 
theoretical explanations of group behavior under alcohol, 
namely deindividuation and group monitoring. 
Social Facilitation and Social Loafing 
Groups potentially bring both advantages and 
disadvantages to cumulative quantity estimation task 
performance. Studies into social facilitation suggest that 
simply being part of a group can lead to an increase in the 
effort and resources directed at a task. Specifically, the mere 
presence of others can led to improved performance by 
increasing the “dominant” response, for example people try 
harder and more persistently at simple tasks (Triplett, 
1898; Zajonc& Sales, 1966). This effect occurs only when 
individuals perceive themselves as personally accountable for 
a performance they believe will be evaluated (Geen, 1989). 
We might expect to see social facilitation of performance, 
particularly among members of sober groups, when group 
members make private judgments. This corresponds to the 
classic “coaction” situation in which social facilitation effects 
have been observed in previous research. The net effects of 
social facilitation can be tested by comparing the accuracy of 
lone individuals with the accuracy of private estimates made 
by group members before they communicate with their group. 
In contrast, group membership could also lead to a 
reduction in effort directed at a task either through social 
loafing—the reduction of effort exerted at a task when labor is 
divided among members of a group (Karau& Williams, 1993) 
—or because attention previously directed at the task is 
allocated to attending to the group (Gastorf, Suls, & Sanders, 
1980). We might expect to observe social loafing effects in 
the group consensus stage because that is the point at which 
members may decide simply to allow others to do the “work” 
involved in deciding a group judgment. The net effects of 
social loafing can be tested by comparing the accuracy of 
group decisions with the mean accuracy of private estimates 
made by group members. 
Once group members share information, group decision 
making processes may also affect accuracy (Harries, Yaniv, & 
Harvey, 2004). Accuracy gains can be made by both 
the statistical error reduction due to aggregating members' 
judgments and because members can compare, identify, and 
reject inaccurate judgments (Harries et al., 2004; Yaniv, 
2004). Groups typically outperform individuals in quantity 
estimation tasks (Sniezek& Henry, 1989). Therefore sober 
groups might be expected to equal or outperform sober 
individuals. 
Group decisions can also be affected by systematic biases 
that may increase the likelihood they will endorse inaccurate 
information. For example, early studies intosocial 
norm formation demonstrated that individuals' quantitative 
judgments are often moderated by group pressure, even when 
the group norm conflicts with perceptual evidence (Asch, 
1951; Sherif, 1936), especially when responses are witnessed 
by other group members (Abrams, Wetherell, Cochrane, 
Hogg, & Turner, 1990). It seems conceivable that alcohol 
might induce error proneness among individual members and 
this could become consolidated by normative pressures into 
an erroneous group consensus. 
This research explored these questions by having 
participants complete a cumulative quantity estimation task in 
either a placebo condition or while moderately intoxicated 
with alcohol. The alcohol consumption factor was crossed 
with group membership. Participants completed the task alone 
or as part of a four-person group. 
Deindividuation and Group Monitoring 
Social loafing and social facilitation may be useful for 
characterizing motivational influences in group performance. 
However, they do not specify the decision process groups use 
to make judgments. Abrams et al. (2006) identified two 
mechanisms that may be especially relevant to the effects of 
alcohol on group judgments;deindividuation and group 
monitoring. Deindividuation predicts that alcohol will have a 
negative impact on the accuracy of groups' judgments. 
Alternatively, group monitoring predicts that the deleterious 
effects of alcohol will be compensated by aspects of group 
process that sustain optimal judgments. These two 
mechanisms can be modeled mathematically. 
Deindividuation 
Both group membership and alcohol reduce self-
awareness and self-regulation (Hull, 1981; Mullen, 1986). 
When self-awareness/regulation in a group are reduced, this is 
theorized as a state of deindividuation (Diener, 1980). 
Deindividuation in groups leads to reliance on salient 
emergent group norms, and reduces systematic information 
processing (Postmes& Spears, 1998). Lowered sense of 
accountability has also been shown to decrease the effort 
group members direct at a task (Karau& Williams, 1993). 
Thus, it seems plausible that deindividuation whether caused 
by alcohol, group membership or both, could lead to a 
reliance on others judgments, a lack of critical evaluation and 
increased conformity to norms. 
Deindividuation has also been theorized to lead to more 
extreme or polarized group judgments and actions (Bonner, 
Gonzalez, & Sommer, 2004; Diener, Lusk, DeFour, & Flax, 
1980). Thus, one consequence of deindividuation for group 
decision making is that distinctive or extreme judgments in 
the group may serve as salient norms. It is conceivable that 
distinctive judgments may on occasion be correct, and the rest 
of the group erroneous. However, given that alcohol leads to 
impaired performance in individuals, it seems more likely that 
extreme judgments are decreasingly rather than increasingly 
accurate. Furthermore, decreased self-awareness may lead to a 
decreased critical evaluation of such judgments. 
Consequently, salient extreme positions that would be 
rejected by sober group members might hold sway among 
groups that have consumed alcohol. 
We note that deindividuation does not always occur in 
groups, especially when group size is small (Diener et al., 
1980). In such circumstances, however, the additional 
decreases in self-regulation caused by alcohol may amplify 
relatively small decrements of performance. In support of this 
(although not directly linked to deindividuation), Sayette et al. 
(2004) found that intoxicated groups were more likely to take 
a one-time risk to continue an experiment than were sober 
groups. Such effects seem liable to occur either through a lack 
of critical rejection of outlying judgments by other group 
members, or reliance upon extreme judgments due to their 
heightened salience. This latter process can be modeled by 
predicting that groups will form a consensus to adopt the most 
extreme judgment that any one member of that group initially 
makes. In sum, intoxicated individuals should be more error 
prone than sober individuals. Deindividuation in groups will 
either consolidate these errors by converging on the central 
tendency, or exaggerate the errors by converging on extreme 
positions. 
Group Monitoring 
The group monitoring hypothesis offers an alternative 
prediction (Abrams et al., 2006). This hypothesis predicts that 
group process can compensate for the effects of 
alcohol. Abrams et al. (2006) found support for the group 
monitoring hypothesis in relation to attraction to risk. When 
rating the attractiveness of a series of bets, intoxicated 
individuals were more attracted by risk than sober individuals. 
Moreover, alcohol had no effect on groups' attraction to risk. 
In relation to cumulative quantity estimation, groups could 
improve upon judgments in two ways. First, the presence of 
other group membership could motivate better individual 
performance, negating the deleterious effect of alcohol. 
Second, the decision-making processes used by groups may 
improve performance. For example, even among intoxicated 
members, a comparison of quantity estimations could reveal 
outlying judgments. Discarding such judgments should 
increase accuracy (Yaniv, 1997, 2004). Additionally, 
differences in levels of confidence in ones' judgments can be 
communicated so that, assuming members with greater 
accuracy tend to be more confident, more accurate members 
would carry more weight in the group's judgment. Finally, a 
group member who fails to attend to particular information 
can be made aware of it by a comember. 
Collectively, these factors could 
reduce deindividuation effects and decrease the impact of 
erroneous judgments. Based on Abrams et al. (2006) it seems 
plausible that, at moderate levels of alcohol intoxication, 
group members can still pool their information to compensate 
for the increased error proneness of individual members. 
Thus, according to the group monitoring hypothesis, alcohol 
consumption should have a less damaging effect on accuracy 
of group decisions compared with the judgments of lone 
individuals. 
Group monitoring can be modeled mathematically by 
adopting assumptions from Davis' Social Judgment Scheme 
(SJS; Davis, 1996). This assumes that groups will converge 
on decisions that reflect the highest degree of consensus 
(orprototypicality) in the group. Individual group members 
whose decisions are close to the area of most consensus are 
given a high weighting in the final judgment, whereas those 
further away have decreasing impact. The SJS model assigns 
weight to each individual's judgment according to how close 
it is to the preferences of each of the other group members. 
The less central the judgment, the lower weight it receives, 
and the less impact it has upon the final judgment. As 
members with central judgments will exert more influence 
than those with extreme judgments, the final decision should 
therefore fall closer to central judgments than peripheral 
judgments.1 
The present research tested the deindividuation and group 
monitoring explanations of how alcohol affects groups 
compared with individuals. As far as we are aware, this is the 
first research to test effects of alcohol on group vigilance 
performance, and the first to conduct any formal model tests 
for group decision processes when groups have consumed 
alcohol. The deindividuation prediction is that group 
membership will combine with and exacerbate the effects of 
alcohol. In contrast, the group monitoring prediction is that 
group membership will insulate group members from the 
effects of alcohol. Both actual judgmental accuracy and tests 
of how adequately mathematical models simulate actual 
behavior are used to test the two explanations. 
Overview 
Participants participated in the experiment either alone or 
as a group of four people. Individuals and groups either 
consumed alcohol or a placebo. In the group conditions, 
participants first made a private judgment and were then 
required to reach an agreement on a group judgment. To 
examine the effects of alcohol it is possible to conduct three 
analyses: (1) individuals' judgments can be compared with the 
private judgments made by group members; (2) individuals' 
judgments can be compared with group decisions; and, (3) 
group decisions can be compared with the average of the 
private judgments made by members within each group. 
These analyses allow us to consider whether group decision 
processes have an effect over and above that of merely being 
in a group. This design also allows us to test formally 
specified models of how groups combine their judgments to 
reach a decision. 
Method 
Participants 
Procedures were given consent by ethical review panels 
prior to use and conformed to the ethical guidelines of both 
the British Psychological Society and The American 
Psychological Association. Two hundred and eighty-six 
university students (191 male) participated in the experiment. 
Sixty-six participated as individuals and the remainder in 
four-person, single-sex groups (n = 55). Single-sex groups 
were selected to avoid possible confounds arising from cross-
gender interactions. On recruitment, participants 
gave informed consent before completing a revised Alcohol 
Use Disorders Identification Test (Hopthrow, Abrams, Frings, 
& Hulbert, 2007) to screen out abnormally high alcohol 
consumers and those that did not consume alcohol. 
Experimental sessions commenced late afternoon. Participants 
were required not to eat for 3 hours, and to abstain from 
alcohol for 18 hours, prior to participating. 
Design 
Participants were randomly assigned to condition in a two 
(Condition: Alcohol,Placebo) by two (Decision Level: 
Individual, Group) between-participants experiment. In 
addition, within the Group decision level there were two 
phases (Private Judgments, Group Consensus) that can be 
compared separately with the individual level, and can be 
treated as a repeated measure by aggregating the private 
judgments to a within group mean. 
Procedure and Materials 
On arrival at the laboratory, participants' breath alcohol 
concentration (BrAC) was measured with a Lion SD400 
Alcometer. One participant had a BrAC greater than 0 and 
was therefore not eligible to participate. Participants were 
weighed and briefed, and signed informed consent and 
medical screening forms. They were then given a strong, 
peppermint-tasting, lozenge (“Fisherman's Friend”) to 
disguise the flavor of the drink. In the alcohol condition, the 
drink consisted of equal parts orange juice, tonic, and 40% 
abv vodka (measured to deliver 1.13g of ethanol per kg of 
body weight for males, 0.74g per kg for females). This 
quantity of alcohol was calculated to intoxicate participants at 
a maximum level of 0.08% BAC (the U.K. and US drink-and-
drive limit). In the placebo condition a mixture of orange juice 
and tonic was administered with 2 ml of vodka floated on the 
surface (insufficient to register when breathalyzed). 
Participants were given 6 minutes to consume the drink. This 
method of alcohol administration was adapted from previous 
work by Fillmore and Weafer (2004) and Maylor and Rabbitt 
(1993), and has been used in Abrams et al. 
(2006)and Hopthrow et al. (2007). Participants were informed 
that the consumption of the drink should not be unpleasant, 
but if they felt any unpleasant effects they should stop 
drinking. They were also told that if they stopped drinking 
they would not forfeit any of their fee for participation and 
could leave when it was safe to do so (i.e., when their BAC 
was below 0.028%). During the subsequent absorption phase, 
participants viewed videos of comedy shows. Participants 
were breathalyzed after the absorption phase. 
Participants were told they would hear a short, 
prerecorded passage and were instructed to estimate the 
number of times the word “the” had occurred as soon as the 
passage finished, without conferral. They were told they 
should count without any form of record. The target word, 
'the,' appeared 20 times in a 300-word passage about Russian 
history (Andrews &Mitrokhin, 1999). Similar counting tasks 
have been used to measure sustained attention in the past 
(Ortuño et al., 2002). The present task was considered 
especially suitable for the present research, as alcohol 
consumption has been shown to affect individuals' sustained 
attention (Clifasefi, Takarangi, & Bergman, 2006; Rohrbaugh 
et al., 1988). 
After listening to the extract, all participants privately 
recorded their individual estimates. Participants in the group 
condition then discussed their estimates and recorded a single 
group decision (their consensual decision). On completion of 
the experiment, participants remained in the laboratory until 
their BAC was below 0.028%. At this point they were 
debriefed and paid for their time. 
Results 
Mean BAC in the alcohol condition was consistent with 
comparable research (e.g.,Hopthrow et al., 2007) at 0.06%. 
To assess the accuracy of the quantity estimations, we 
subtracted the participants' answers from the correct answer 
(there were 20 instances of the word “the”). In the case of 
group-level decisions, the group judgment was subtracted 
from the correct answer. When overestimations occurred 
an absolute error was calculated. An absolute error approach 
was chosen because both under- and overestimations indicate 
poor performance, but statistically differentiating between the 
two increases error variance, increasing the risk of a Type II 
error. Mean errors and their associated standard deviations 
can be seen in Figure 1. 
Three ANOVAs were conducted. The first examined 
whether alcohol affected group members' abilities to make 
judgments on their own relative to individuals. The second 
examined whether group members' individual performance 
was affected by alcohol relative to the group's final judgment 
(group consensus). Finally an ANOVA was conducted to 
differentiate between deindividuation explanations and group 
monitoring explanations by examining how alcohol affected 
individuals relative to group consensus. 
A condition (alcohol/placebo) × decision level (individual 
vs. group member's private judgments) ANOVA was 
conducted upon the number of errors. Means and standard 
deviations are shown in Figure 1. There was a 
significant main effect of condition. Participants made larger 
errors in the alcohol than in the placebo condition, F(1, 281) = 
10.53, p < .001, η2 = .04. There was also a significant main 
effect of decision level. Lone individuals' made larger errors 
than did group members when making private 
judgments, F(1, 281) = 11.32, p < .001, η2 = .04. The 
interaction between condition and decision level was 
nonsignificant, F(1, 281) = 2.71, p = .10, η2 = .01. However, 
when considering an a priori hypothesis it is meaningful to 
perform simple main effects analysis (Howell, 1992). Recall 
that deindividuation andsocial loafing might both result in 
worse performance in a group, exacerbated by alcohol. Group 
monitoring and accountability might result in improved 
performance in a group, and might counteract any impairment 
caused by alcohol. Within the placebo condition, the simple 
effect of decision level was not significant, F(1, 281) = 
1.91, p = .169, η2 < .01. However, in the alcohol condition, 
individuals made larger errors than group members, F(1, 281) 
= 10.25, p = .002, η2 = .04. 
 
 
Figure 1. Mean number of errors of made by individuals and group 
consensus, in placebo and alcohol conditions  
Individuals Versus Group Members' Private Judgments 
Group Members' Private Judgments Versus Group Consensus 
To compare group members' private judgments with their 
group's consensual judgment, the private judgments were 
averaged within each group and a mixed ANOVA was 
conducted with condition as a between participants factor and 
decision level (private vs. consensus) as a within participants 
factor. Note that the standard deviations for the private 
judgments differ from those in Figure 1 because of the 
aggregation. The standard deviations were 2.65 in the alcohol 
condition and 1.86 in the placebo condition. 
There was a significant main effect of decision level. 
Group consensus was less erroneous (M = 3.71, SD = 2.05) 
than group members' private judgments (M = 5.24,SD = 
2.29), F(1, 53) = 67.73, p < .001, η2 = .38. In line with the 
group monitoring prediction, the main effect of condition was 
not significant, F(1, 53) = .96, p = .33, η2 = .02. The 
interaction between condition and decision level was 
marginal, F(1, 53) = 3.02, p = .088, η2 = .05. As in the 
preceding analysis, we examined the simple main effects of 
decision level within conditions. As shown in Figure 1, Group 
consensus was less erroneous than private judgments both in 
the placebo condition,F(1, 53) = 8.45, p = .005, η2 = .14 and 
the alcohol condition, F(1, 53) = 25.01, p < .001, η2 = .32. 
Individual Judgments Versus Group Consensus 
To directly test between deindividuation and group 
monitoring explanations, a third ANOVA was conducted 
upon error scores, with alcohol and decision level 
(Individuals' judgments/Group consensus) as between-
participant factors. There was a significant main effect of 
condition, F(1, 116) = 4.68, p = .033, η2 = .04. Participants 
made larger errors in the alcohol condition (M = 6.24, SD = 
5.06) than in the placebo condition (M = 4.94, SD = 3.42). 
There was also a significant main effect of decision level, F(1, 
116) = 27.02, p < .001, η2 = .19. Individuals made larger 
errors (M = 4.94, SD = 3.42) than groups (M = 3.71, SD = 
2.05). More important is the significant interaction between 
condition and decision level, F(1, 116) = 4.56, p = .035, η2 = 
.04. Simple effects analysis revealed alcohol elevated 
individuals' errors, F(1, 116) = 9.74, p = .002, η2 = .08 but did 
not affect group errors, F(1, 116) < .001, ns, η2 < .01. 
Furthermore, groups were more accurate than individuals in 
both the alcohol, F(1, 116) = 22.65, p < .001, η2 = .17 and 
placebo condition, F(1, 116) = 5.67, p = .019, η2 = .05. 
Social Judgment Scheme Analysis 
To examine the likely process underlying group 
consensus, we conducted statistical model fit tests (see Davis, 
1996). Kolmogorov–Smirnov (two samples) tests were used 
to test the fit of each model. This test compares the actual 
decisions made by each group to the score the different 
models predict they should have made based on 
the distribution of judgments made by members prior to their 
group's decision. In these analyses models are null hypotheses 
therefore a conservative alpha (> .20) is used for significance 
testing, as is the convention in other research modeling group 
dynamics (Zuber, Crott& Werner, 1992). 
We first examined how the different models related to one 
another by inspecting thecorrelations among the expected 
values provided by each model within the alcohol 
and placebo conditions. In the placebo condition, only the 
correlation between the mean and median models was 
significant, r(25) = .88, p < .001. In the alcohol condition the 
pattern was the same, only the correlation between mean and 
median models was significant, r(30) = .97, p < .001. All 
other intercorrelations ranged between +.18 and −.19, all ps > 
.32. Thus, aside from these central tendencymodels, all others 
made independent predictions. 
As outlined in the introduction, we believe that 
the deindividuation process could be reflected either by 
a heuristic adoption of the group's central 
tendency(operationalized as the mean or median of private 
judgments) or by seizing on a salient extreme score 
(operationalized as the most discrepant from the mean of 
private judgments). Thus, the deindividuation hypothesis 
would be supported to the extent that these positions are 
adopted as the group consensus. Given that deindividuation 
should be most likely in the alcohol condition, this prediction 
should be supported more clearly in that condition. 
The group monitoring hypothesis assumes that group 
members should strive to find an accurate consensual 
position, reflected by the SJS model which places greatest 
weight on the region of closest consensus among private 
judgments. The presumption is that the group monitoring 
process should mean that members discard outlying, and 
generally less accurate, positions. The hypothesis expects this 
process to occur in both the placebo and the alcohol 
conditions. Assuming private judgments are relatively 
accurate in the placebo condition, the mean, median, and 
consensus models should all fit reasonably well and the 
extreme model should fit poorly. Assuming private judgments 
are less accurate in the alcohol condition we expect the 
consensus (SJS) model to fit better than either mean or 
median, and we expect a poor fit for the extreme model. 
As can be seen in Table 1, in the placebo condition group 
consensus was predicted by the mean, median, and SJS 
models whereas the extreme score model fits less well. 
Prediction from mean, median, and SJS model were in the 
same region because the greatest consensus coincides 
with central tendency (as one would expect if all group 
members were reasonably accurate). Thus, the decisions are 
consistent with group monitoring but less so 
with deindividuation. In the alcohol condition, group 
consensus was not accurately predicted by the mean 
or median models, and not at all by the extreme model. 
However, consensus was well predicted by SJS. As 
demonstrated by the ANOVA tests, the central 
tendencies (mean/median model) of intoxicated group 
members' judgments were liable to be erroneous, presumably 
because of because of extreme errors by some members. In 
line with the group monitoring hypothesis, and with the 
sustained levels of accuracy in group decisions, the groups 
discarded these extreme scores, and relied upon the areas of 
consensus when making decisions. 
Discussion 
The present research investigated the interactive effects of 
alcohol and group decision-making processes on a cumulative 
quantity estimation task requiring vigilance. Alcohol reduced 
individuals' accuracy but had a lesser effect on group 
members' and group's decisions, respectively. Furthermore, 
group members' private estimates and group consensus were 
less erroneous than individuals' judgments. These findings are 
contrary to predictions generated by 
the deindividuationhypothesis that groups' accuracy should 
significantly decrease, particularly when members are 
intoxicated. In line with the group monitoring explanation, 
group consensus remained equally accurate, regardless of 
whether members had consumed alcohol. From these findings 
we conclude that both group membership and group 
discussion reduced the effect of alcohol on performance. 
It seems likely that these effects were only partially 
attributable to social facilitation. When group members were 
sober, mere group membership did not significantly increase 
their accuracy (effect size η2 = .14). When they were 
intoxicated, however, member membership of a group 
facilitated their performance (η2 = .32). Thus, group 
membership made a bigger difference in the intoxicated 
condition than the placebo condition. It seems likely that 
individuals and group members were already quite motivated 
to be accurate in the placebo condition, and that being part of 
a group helped to sustain that motivation in the alcohol 
condition. 
We expected that group monitoring processes should also 
contribute to group accuracy by affecting their decision 
processes. Specifically, we hypothesized that group 
monitoring would lead groups to agree on judgments that 
reflected the highest consensus in the group (SJS). In 
the placebo condition model fit tests indicated SJS predicted 
judgments, and so did predictions based on the mean 
ormedian of the group members' estimates. However in the 
alcohol condition, where members' private judgments were 
more erroneous, decisions reflected the consensual process 
fitting the SJS model rather than simple convergence on the 
group mean or median. It is likely that this occurred because 
the increased frequency of more erroneous, outlying 
individual judgments made the mean and median models less 
accurate in the alcohol condition. 
Questions for Future Research 
The present research raises several questions for further 
exploration. Our findings suggest that group membership can 
partially offset the impairing effects of alcohol on quantity 
estimation judgments. It is not clear whether this arises 
because of a closer attention to the task itself or whether it 
arises from evaluating the relative capacities (e.g., 
drunkenness) of fellow group members. In the present 
research all members were intoxicated to a similar level 
matched to their body mass index, but it may be that some had 
higher tolerance levels or were less affected than others. 
Presumably in natural groups, there is also likely to be a range 
of levels of alcohol consumption. Therefore it would be of 
interest to explore drunk and sober group members' 
perceptions of drunk and sober colleagues differ, to see 
whether they are sufficiently sensitive to these differences to 
assign different weights to information or judgments provided 
by each member. 
Group members' expectancies about the effects of 
different types and amounts of alcohol upon their fellows may 
influence group monitoring (Fillmore & Blackburn, 2002). 
For example people may regard some types of drink as more 
“potent,” which may affect the extent to which they believe 
they need to monitor members consuming those drinks. 
Likewise some people may believe they are unaffected by 
alcohol up to certain levels of consumption. These 
expectations may affect their openness to being monitored 
and influenced by other members. A related issue is the role 
of so-called “designated drivers” within a group. These are 
members who explicitly remain sober in the midst of a group 
of drinkers so as to drive them home without risk. It could be 
hypothesized that the presence a designated driver would 
reduce the degree of group monitoring, and increase reliance 
on that member. Alternatively the impact and influence of a 
sober (and in many cases more accurate, less risky, and more 
sensible) group member may be less when they are among a 
drunk group than a sober one, particularly on tasks unrelated 
to that member's role (e.g., nondriving activities). 
The manner in which information is distributed across a 
group of drinkers may also be of interest. In the present study, 
all task members had access to the information needed to 
complete the task (i.e., they could all hear the stimuli). In 
many work situations, however, some group members may 
have exclusive access to some information, and need to 
communicate this to the group before a successful collective 
decision can be reached. For example, it is conceivable that 
the effects of hidden profiles and groups' inability to 
adequately share information may be made more extreme 
when members have been drinking (Stasser& Titus, 1985). 
Alternatively, group monitoring may still negate some of the 
effects of alcohol in this case (as group members try 
harder/attend more). 
We note two important limitations in the present research. 
First we only raised alcohol intake to a moderate level, but it 
is known that many of the worst effects of alcohol arise 
through extreme binge drinking (Department of Health, 
2007). Second, we focused on a relatively objective and 
nonemotional judgment task, but it is also known that groups 
that drink engage in more socioemotional activities (cf. Kelly 
& Spoor, 2007; Sayette et al., 2004). Whereas we have shown 
that groups can offset cognitive effects of moderate alcohol 
consumption, we do not assume that this will continue at 
higher levels of intoxication. Individuals need to be 
sufficiently capable of attending to one another and the group 
for group monitoring to occur. On the other hand, it seems 
likely that some types of group goal (e.g., conflict or violence 
against a target), particularly those that involve a sense of 
identification with the group might appear to be enacted more 
forcefully with increasing levels of alcohol (e.g., gang 
violence) (e.g., Postmes& Spears, 1998). The ways in which 
group goals are achieved by heightening motivational 
processes toward particular goals, as distinct from sustaining 
continuous and rational decision processes, may therefore 
differ at different levels of alcohol intake. 
In the present study, group membership and group 
discussion ameliorated the effects of alcohol. We are also 
aware there are likely to be other boundary conditions for 
group monitoring. For instance, if tasks are highly difficult or 
prior knowledge cannot be applied, no accurate central 
tendency, or basis to evaluate other judgments, will exist and 
the group monitoring effect will disappear. In the present 
research participants were asked to judge as accurately as 
possible. Given this motivational goal it seems that group 
monitoring sustained accuracy despite alcohol. However, it is 
possible that alcohol and group membership may combine to 
lead to more extreme judgments when groups have different 
goals, such as speed rather than accuracy. In addition, goals 
that are tangential to the task, for instance in response to 
external threats experienced in situations such as intergroup 
competition (Hopthrow et al., 2007) could also come into 
play. 
Another feature of the task that could affect the group 
performance is that members first made private judgments. In 
situations where group members do not make explicit private 
judgments prior to reaching consensus we might predict 
alcohol would result in greater process loss due to 
production blocking (Steiner, 1972). That is, group members 
may be more likely to forget their unstated private judgments 
and thus be less able to reach an accurate group consensus. 
This would be an interesting avenue for future research. 
Finally, group members in the present study were 
strangers to one another before the task began. In the case of 
groups beyond the laboratory with a history of problem 
solving and judgment making, alcohol may have differential 
effects. High status group members may exert more influence 
when groups are intoxicated, as group members rely upon 
their judgments more. Alternatively, the influence of high 
status members may be reduced, as they are deemed to as 
impaired as other group members. 
In conclusion the present research complements an 
emerging body of evidence investigating how alcohol affects 
group processes. Alcohol levels that are sufficient to increase 
individuals' vigilance errors do not have the same impact 
upon groups. The decision process used by groups appears to 
offset the deleterious effects of alcohol upon individual 
members. Alcohol consumption is often a social business, yet 
despite the social, practical and economic significance of this 
fact, surprisingly little research has examined the 
precise social dynamics involved when people drink alcohol 
in groups. The present work shows that alcohol and group 
processes can combine to produce some distinctive outcomes. 
We hope that, despite the intensity of effort and resources to 
conduct such work, the present findings will stimulate further 
research in this area. 
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Footnotes 
1 The mathematical formula for the SJS model states the 
group judgment (G) is the product of the sum of each 
members judgment (x) weighted by (c); G = c1x1 +c2x2 +… 
+ crxr. Where the weights (c) are themselves a function of the 
distance between each individual members' judgment and the 
judgments of each of the other group members; 
 Where; f(|xi − xj|) = e-θ(|xi − xj|), i≠j. 
Following Davis, (1996) and Ohtsubo, Masuchi and 
Nakanishi, (2002) the value of was θ was set to 1. 
